Prospects for Zimbabwe’s Transition
Remarks by James D. McGee, U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe on the "Prospects for Zimbabwe's Transition" at a public event hosted by Freedom House
October 16, 2008
Thank you, Tom. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s a pleasure to be here to talk with you about the current situation in Zimbabwe. Your presence is reflective of a widespread and abiding interest in Zimbabwe. I have often wondered why this interest exists in a small country in southern Africa with a population now of only about 9 million people. In 1980, at Zimbabwe’s independence, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania told Robert Mugabe that he had inherited a jewel and that he should protect and nourish it. After two decades of post-independence disappointments in Africa, Zimbabwe represented unlimited potential—a country that could serve as a beacon for the rest of the continent. Twenty-eight years later that promise has obviously not been fulfilled. Outside of Zimbabwe there is a sense of sadness for this, but also an enduring optimism that things can be set right. Hence, I think, the continuing interest. I have been asked to speak on “Prospects for Zimbabwe’s Transition.” I believe that a transition has begun. The relevant questions would appear to be how long this transition will take and how it will be accomplished. In attempting to answer these questions, I would like to discuss with you the current economic, humanitarian, and social situation which is to a large extent driving change, the political landscape, and the role of the international community in supporting change. Today, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe is well over 90 percent. Those who are employed are often not paid enough to cover their transportation costs to and from work. Inflation, which last week was estimated by the government to be over 200 million percent per annum, is estimated by private economists to be between 10 and 50 billion percent. That’s billion with a “b.” The day-to-day realities of hyperinflation are devastating to the average Zimbabwean. Bank queues form in the middle of the night because people want to be in line early in the morning to make the maximum withdrawal, which is never more than the equivalent of US$ 5. Shops continue to face serious food shortages, and prices are beyond the reach of most. As a result of the dire economic situation, more than two million people in Zimbabwe need food assistance. By January, that number could hit five million. That’s over half of the people in Zimbabwe who may be dependent on food from outside donors. This in a country that at one time exported food and was considered the “bread basket” of southern Africa. The World Food Program reports that one in four children in Zimbabwe is malnourished. October is planting season in Zimbabwe. Right now, farmers should be busy planting and preparing their fields for the fast-approaching rains. Instead, as in recent years, seeds and fertilizer have been given mainly to supporters of ZANU-PF, the ruling party, and the government continues to use its dwindling foreign currency to buy luxury vehicles for ZANU-PF officials and insiders. The educational system, once one of the best—if not the best—in Africa is in shambles. Teachers make less than US$ 10 per month. Many have left the country for employment elsewhere, and estimates are that Zimbabwe has less than half the teachers it needs. The quality of education has correspondingly deteriorated. In the mid-1990s, high school exam pass rates were over 70 percent. Last year, the number was 11 percent. This month, two of the country’s principal teachers’ unions called for the school year to be repeated because students were unprepared to advance to the next level. I could also talk about the almost non-existent health care system, the increasing lack of power, and problems in water distribution. I think you get the picture. Zimbabwe, the former jewel of Africa, is on the precipice. ZANU-PF, the ruling party, is aware that it cannot turn Zimbabwe around, but needs international assistance. In March, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe permitted relatively free elections in the hope that he would be legitimized after winning and that international assistance would then resume. The people of Zimbabwe refused to do his bidding. They expressed their feelings about what Mugabe and his party had done to Zimbabwe by giving the opposition a majority in Parliament and giving Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) candidate Morgan Tsvangirai a 48 percent plurality. (This was the official result; vote rigging fraud may have prevented Tsvangirai from receiving an outright majority.) Stung by the election results, Mugabe and ZANU-PF unleashed a reign of terror to retaliate against those who had voted against them in the election, and to intimidate voters into supporting Mugabe in the run-off election against Tsvangirai. Hundreds of Zimbabweans were killed, thousands seriously injured, and tens of thousands displaced. The strategy backfired and, even though Mugabe won the June run-off election—which Tsvangirai withdrew from because of the violence—the international community and region made clear that Mugabe lacked legitimacy. He and ZANU-PF had no choice but to negotiate with the MDC. Negotiations resulted in an agreement signed on September 15 designed to create an interim power-sharing government while a new constitution was drafted that would serve as a basis for new elections.
Formation of the government has stalled, however, primarily over the allocation of ministries. The MDC has insisted it be given the home affairs ministry, which has jurisdiction over the police, and the finance ministry. ZANU-PF is resisting. It fears that MDC control of these ministries will result in investigations and prosecutions of ZANU-PF officials for corruption and other illegal activities. Additionally, MDC control of the finance ministry would cut off the ZANU-PF patronage spigot which has enriched ZANU-PF officials and insiders. And the MDC is insisting that negotiations be reopened on all ministries. ZANU-PF signed the power-sharing agreement because it realized it was powerless to turn the economy around and that only legitimacy conferred by the inclusion of the MDC in a government could result in international assistance. At the same time, ZANU-PF wishes to maintain power. Its failure to negotiate in good faith to achieve a genuine power-sharing government is the cause of the current impasse. A small but important example of ZANU-PF’s bad faith is its failure to return Tsvangirai’s passport, seized in the run-up to the June election, or to issue him a diplomatic passport as prime-minister designate. The SADC countries, and the AU realize that ZANU-PF is being unreasonable and is now the primary obstacle to creation of a new government. However, can we expect them to pressure Mugabe to complete an equitable agreement? I believe that Mugabe, and the hardliners within his party, who stand to lose with an agreement, will continue to stall. Having said this, the September 15 agreement itself is highly imperfect. Mugabe as president and Tsvangirai as prime minister will have what appear to be equivalent powers and it is unclear how the decision-making process within government will work. We can expect a continued absence of good will from Mugabe and his allies as they attempt to cling to power and continue to enrich themselves. Despite this gloomy picture, there are reasons to believe, as Tsvangirai himself has stated, that Zimbabwe is on the path of an inevitable transition:
1) In the March elections, probably the freest in Zimbabwe’s history, the Zimbabwean people expressed their will by electing a majority of the opposition to Parliament and by giving Tsvangirai a plurality (at a minimum) of the presidential vote; 2) Last month, for the first time, the House of Assembly elected an opposition member as speaker; 3) For the first time the MDC will be a part of government; 4) SADC and the AU are beginning to express, albeit mostly privately, their frustration with the obstructionist behavior of Mugabe and ZANU-PF; 5) And finally, ZANU-PF is not monolithic—there are significant fractures within the party. Let me say a word on the role of the international community.
The U.S. will continue to provide substantial food and humanitarian assistance (over US$ 200 million in 2008). We will maintain targeted sanctions against Zimbabwean individuals and organizations whose policies and practices undermine democratic processes and institutions. When we have seen concrete evidence of lasting political and economic reform, we will reengage with Zimbabwe and provide developmental assistance. I hope SADC and the AU will constructively work with the parties to achieve a genuine power-sharing agreement. There is a Shona proverb that says “you can’t hide from the truth.” I think we are at the point where even many in ZANU-PF’s leadership realize they can no longer hide from the dire economic, humanitarian, and political situation that is now the reality of Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans are ready—and desperate—for fundamental change. The international and regional communities must continue to prod and pressure Zimbabwe and its leaders, but ultimately it is the Zimbabwean people that will bring about change. The path may be slow and rocky, but I believe the journey has begun.
